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Taxation must be equal and uniform!

Property taxes must be equal and uniform.
Protesting taxes must be a fair and equitable process.
All property must be valued and taxed equally and uniformly.

Taxpayers for equal appraisal!
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Landmark Case Overview

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UNITED INVESTORS REALTY TRUST, Appellee On Appeal from the 80th District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 98-43435 O P I N I O N  This is page 3....continued from Page 2. The district court determined that United Investors’ interpretation and application of section 42.26(d) was correct, and rendered judgment in favor of United Investors. In so doing, the district court found that the proper appraised value for Mason Park Centre was $10,239,163.00, as Little had calculated. It also awarded reasonable statutory attorneys’ fees to United Investors in the amount of $12,650.00, pursuant to Section 42.29(a) of the Tax Code. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 42.29(a) (Vernon Supp. 2000). On appeal, HCAD argues that the trial court erred in entering judgment in favor of 4 United Investors, and therefore United Investors would not be entitled to attorneys’ fees. In support of this argument, HCAD contends that the trial court’s taxable value is neither based on market value, nor bears any relationship to market value, thus contravening Article VIII, sections 1 (a) and (b) of the Texas Constitution. DISCUSSION AND HOLDINGS On appeal, HCAD argues that if Article VIII, sections 1 (a) and (b) of the Texas Constitution require ad valorem appraisals to be equal, uniform, and based upon reasonable market value, either the trial court has applied section 42.26(d) of the Tax Code in an unconstitutional manner, or section 42.26(d) is, itself, unconstitutional. However, HCAD stated that it is not challenging the constitutionality of section 42.26(d). Rather, it argues that, in order to establish inequality, section 42.26(d) should be interpreted as requiring comparisons of appraised values to actual market value. As we explain below, we do not adopt such an interpretation. In construing a statute, our primary goals are to ascertain the Legislature’s intent in enacting it, and give effect to that intent. In re the County of Jim Wells, 44 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 407, 2000 WL 33146426, at *2 (Tex. Feb. 1, 2001). When a statute is clear and unambiguous, we need not resort to rules of statutory construction to construe it. Id. However, we may still consider a statute’s legislative history, the consequences of a particular construction, and the statute’s objectives, among other things. Id. We start with the presumption that this statute is constitutional. HL Farm Corp. v. Self, Go to next page...